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Abstract
Purpose. This study aims to render a fundamental assessment of the Basel II internal ratings-based
(IRB) approach by taking readings of the Australian banking sector since the implementation of Basel II
and comparing them with signals from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit
ratings. The IRB approach to capital adequacy for credit risk, which implements an asymptotic single
risk factor (ASRF) model, plays an important role in protecting the Australian banking sector against
insolvency.
Methodology. Realisations of the single systematic risk factor, interpreted as describing the prevailing
state of the Australian economy, are recovered from the ASRF model and compared with macroeconomic
indicators. Similarly, estimates of distance-to-default, reflecting the capacity of the Australian banking
sector to absorb credit losses, are recovered from the ASRF model and compared with financial statistics
and external credit ratings. With the implementation of Basel II preceding the time when the effect of
the financial crisis of 2007–09 was most acutely felt, we measure the impact of the crisis on the Australian
banking sector.
Findings. Measurements from the ASRF model find general agreement with signals from macro-
economic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. This leads to a favourable assessment
of the ASRF model for the purposes of capital allocation, performance attribution and risk monitoring.
Our empirical analysis reveals that the recent crisis imparted a mild stress on the Australian banking
sector.
Limitations. Given the range of economic conditions, from mild contraction to moderate expansion,
experienced in Australia since the implementation of Basel II, we cannot attest to the validity of the
model specification of the IRB approach for its intended purpose of solvency assessment.
Originality. Access to internal bank data collected by the prudential regulator distinguishes our research
from other empirical studies on the IRB approach and financial crisis of 2007–09. We are not the first
to attempt to measure the effects of the recent crisis, but we believe that we are the first to do so using
regulatory data.
Keywords: internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model, credit
value-at-risk (VaR), distance-to-default, reverse stress testing, financial crisis.
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1. Introduction
Under the Basel II Accord, authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) determine regulatory
capital for credit risk using either the standardised approach or, subject to approval, the internal
ratings-based (IRB) approach. The latter is more expensive to administer, but usually produces
lower regulatory capital requirements than the former. As a consequence, ADIs using the IRB
approach may deploy their capital in pursuit of more (profitable) lending opportunities. This
paper examines the model specification of the IRB approach, the so-called asymptotic single risk
factor (ASRF) model. We render an assessment of the ASRF model by taking readings of the
Australian banking sector since the implementation of Basel II and comparing them with signals
from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. The relatively
short quarterly time series available leads to an intuitive assessment of the ASRF model rather
than any formal testing of its efficacy. A fundamental evaluation of the model specification of
the IRB approach requires access to internal bank data, which are input to the ASRF model.
Support for this research by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) includes
access to these data collected by APRA from the institutions that it supervises.
Upon implementation of Basel II in the first quarter of 2008, APRA had granted the four
largest Australian banks, designated “major” banks, approval to use the IRB approach to capital
adequacy for credit risk. In order to take measurements from the ASRF model of the Australian
banking sector, we aggregate data reported to APRA by the major banks on a quarterly basis
since the implementation of Basel II. We contend that these data are representative of the
Australian banking sector on the basis of the market dominance of the major banks, and the
concentration of their regulatory capital assessed under the IRB approach. The ASRF model
calculates the expectation of credit losses conditional on a realisation of the single systematic risk
factor, which is interpreted as describing the state of the economy, in order to assess regulatory
capital charges. Substituting credit losses incurred into the ASRF model, we solve for realisations
of the single systematic risk factor describing the prevailing state of the Australian economy.
Then, substituting provisions and capital held against credit losses into the ASRF model, and
translating realisations of the single systematic risk factor into distance-to-default, we measure
the level of capitalisation of the Australian banking sector. Our empirical findings comport with
signals from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings. While
making observations about the prevailing state of Australia’s economy and the solvency of its
banking sector, we do not propose model enhancements, nor draw policy implications. Although,
our observations may open a debate on the model specification of the IRB approach or related
regulatory policies.
The range of economic conditions, from mild contraction to moderate expansion, experienced
in Australia since the first quarter of 2008 translate into observations away from the tail of
the distribution of the single systematic risk factor, and hence the portfolio loss distribution.
Accordingly, we argue that our findings support a favourable assessment of the ASRF model for
the purposes of capital allocation, performance attribution and risk monitoring — management
functions that need only be accurate in the measurement of relative risk under “normal” economic
conditions. The IRB approach, however, serves the sole purpose of solvency assessment, which
requires precision in the measurement of absolute risk levels under stressed economic conditions,
or tail events (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision et al., 2010). Therefore, we cannot at-
test to the suitability of the ASRF model for regulatory capital modelling. Evaluating the model
specification of the IRB approach for its intended purpose of solvency assessment would involve
taking readings of banking jurisdictions that have experienced a full-blown economic or financial
crisis since the implementation of Basel II. It would supplement the findings of this study.
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The financial crisis of 2007–09, also known as the global financial crisis, precipitated the
worst global recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. In response to the crisis, the
so-called Basel 2.5 package and Basel III Accord introduce reforms to address deficiencies in the
Basel II framework exposed by the recent crisis. The Basel 2.5 reforms enhance minimum capital
requirements, risk management practices and public disclosures in relation to risks arising from
trading activities, securitisation and exposure to off-balance sheet vehicles. The Basel III reforms
raise the quality and minimum required level of capital; promote the build up of capital buffers;
establish a back-up minimum leverage ratio; improve liquidity and stabilise funding; and assess
a regulatory capital surcharge on systemically important financial institutions. These reforms
complement, rather than supersede, Basel II. In particular, the ASRF model prescribed under
the Basel II IRB approach is unaltered by the introduction of Basel 2.5 and Basel III. It remains
as relevant to solvency assessment today as it has been since its implementation in 2008.
From our fundamental assessment of the model specification of the IRB approach emerges
a methodology for regulators to monitor the prevailing state of the economy as described by
the single systematic risk factor, and the capacity of supervised banks to absorb credit losses as
measured by distance-to-default. Measurements from the ASRF model signalling an overheating
economy and procyclical movements in capital bases, corroborated by macroeconomic perfor-
mance indicators including rapidly accelerating credit growth, would prompt supervisors to lean
against the prevailing winds by, for example, instructing banks to build up their countercyclical
capital buffer introduced under Basel III.
The effects of the financial crisis of 2007–09 were not felt evenly across the globe, and the
Australian economy was largely spared. With the implementation of Basel II preceding the
time when the effect of the crisis was most acutely felt, our empirical analysis reveals that
the crisis imparted a mild stress on the Australian banking sector. We are not the first to
attempt to measure the effects of the recent crisis, but we believe that we are the first to do so
using regulatory data. In evaluating the model specification of the IRB approach we produce
a fundamental assessment of the impact of the crisis on the Australian banking sector using
internal bank data collected by APRA. Other studies on the financial crisis rely on market
data, macroeconomic indicators or published financial statistics. In arguing the resilience of the
Australian economy to the crisis, McDonald and Morling (2011), and Brown and Davis (2010)
describe its performance primarily in terms of macroeconomic indicators and financial statistics.
Our measurements from the ASRF model of the Australian banking sector corroborate their
observations. Allen and Powell (2012), on the other hand, rely on market data and reach a
markedly different conclusion about the condition of the Australian banking sector during the
recent crisis. We submit that their results are biased by plummeting market prices and spiking
volatility reflecting the overreaction of market participants gripped by fear at the depths of the
crisis.
We begin in Section 2 by outlining the model specification of the IRB approach, and discussing
valid criticisms levelled against it. In Section 3 we describe the Basel II capital adequacy reporting
of ADIs that supplies data for our empirical analysis. Section 4 contextualises the Australian
economy over the past decade by comparing its performance with that of the United States and
United Kingdom on macroeconomic indicators and financial statistics. Explanations proffered
for the recent performance of the Australian economy and its resilience to the financial crisis
are discussed in some detail. Measurements from the ASRF model of the Australian banking
sector since the implementation of Basel II are presented in Section 5. Realisations of the single
systematic risk factor describing the prevailing state of the economy measure the impact of the
crisis on the Australian banking sector, while estimates of distance-to-default reflect its capacity
to absorb credit losses. In a variation on the evaluation of distance-to-default, reverse stress
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testing explores stress events that would trigger material supervisory intervention. We conclude
by outlining the direction for future related research.
2. Model Specification of the Internal Ratings-Based Approach
The Basel II IRB approach implements an asset value factor model of credit risk. Asset value
models posit that default or survival of a firm depends on the value of its assets at a given risk
measurement horizon. If the value of its assets is below a critical threshold, its default point,
the firm defaults, otherwise it survives. Asset value models have their roots in Merton’s (1974)
seminal paper. Factor models are a well established, computationally efficient technique for
explaining dependence between variables (Bluhm et al., 2010).
The model specification of the IRB approach assesses capital charges sufficient to absorb credit
losses, and thus protect against insolvency, with a high level of confidence. It applies value-at-risk
(VaR), one of the most widely used measures in risk management, to assign a single numerical
value to a random portfolio credit loss. Let random variable Ln be the (dollar) loss on a credit
portfolio comprising n obligors over a given risk measurement horizon. Adopting the convention
that a loss is a positive number, we define credit VaR at the confidence level α ∈ (0, 1) over a
given risk measurement horizon as the largest portfolio credit loss l such that the probability of
a loss Ln exceeding l is at most (1−α):
VaRα(Ln) = inf{l ∈ R : P(Ln > l) ≤ 1−α}. (2.1)
In probabilistic terms, VaRα(Ln) is simply the α quantile of the portfolio loss distribution,
typically a high quantile that is rarely exceeded. Although computationally expensive, Monte
Carlo simulation is routinely employed to generate the empirical loss distribution and determine
VaR of a credit portfolio. An analytical model of the portfolio loss distribution, on the other
hand, facilitates the fast calculation of credit VaR.
The IRB approach rests on a proposition due to Gordy (2003), which leads to an analytical
approximation to credit VaR, the so-called asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model. It
assumes that:
(1) Portfolios are infinitely fine-grained so that idiosyncratic risk is fully diversified away.
(2) A single systematic risk factor explains dependence across obligors.
As a practical matter, credit portfolios of large, internationally active banks are typically near
the asymptotic granularity of Condition (1). Furthermore, Gordy and Lütkebohmert (2007) pro-
posed a granularity adjustment for quantifying the contribution of name concentrations to port-
folio risk, and hence assessing a capital charge for undiversified idiosyncratic risk. So, moderate
departures from asymptotic granularity need not pose an impediment to assessing ratings-based
capital charges. Condition (2), on the other hand, is more stringent. Denote by Y the single
factor common to all obligors, which may be interpreted as an underlying risk driver or economic
factor, with each realisation describing a scenario of the economy. Gordy established that the α
quantile of the distribution of conditional expectation of portfolio credit loss may be substituted
for the α quantile of the portfolio loss distribution:
lim
n→∞
∣∣VaRα(Ln)− E[Ln |Y = Φ−1(1−α)]∣∣ = 0. (2.2)
Suppose that exposure at default (EAD) and loss given default (LGD) are deterministic quan-
tities, and denote by δi ∈ R+ and ηi ∈ [0, 1] the EAD and LGD, respectively, assigned to obligor i.
Assume that latent random variables modelling the variability in obligors’ asset values are stan-
dard Gaussian and conditionally independent given systematic risk factor Y . We denote by Φ
the standard Gaussian distribution function. Also, let ρ1, . . . , ρn ∈ (0, 1) be correlation param-
eters calibrated to market data where, for Gaussian processes, the pairwise correlation between
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obligors’ asset values is equal to
√
ρiρj . Then, the conditional expectation of portfolio credit loss
is given by
E[Ln |Y = y] =
n∑
i=1
δiηipi(y) =
n∑
i=1
δiηiΦ
(
Φ−1(pi)−√ρi y√
1− ρi
)
, (2.3)
where function pi(y) transforms pi, the unconditional probability of default of obligor i, into
the probability of default (PD) conditional on realisation y ∈ R of systematic risk factor Y , or
conditional probability of default of obligor i. This function, derived by Vasicek (2002), is the
kernel of the model specification of the IRB approach. We remark that conditional expectation
function E[Ln |Y ] is strictly decreasing in y — conditional expectation of portfolio credit loss
falls (respectively, rises) as the economy improves (deteriorates). Thus, the α quantile of the
distribution of E[Ln |Y ] is associated with the (1−α) quantile of the distribution of Y .
Expected portfolio credit loss is the average loss over all realisations y ∈ R of systematic risk
factor Y , defined as
E[Ln] =
n∑
i=1
δiηipi. (2.4)
In keeping with the Basel II Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006), we
define unexpected loss on a credit portfolio as the difference between VaRα(Ln) and E[Ln]. Fur-
thermore, we assume that ADIs set aside provisions for absorbing expected losses, and hold
capital against unexpected losses. This latter assumption is consistent with the prudential stan-
dards of APRA (2008). Appealing to Gordy’s proposition, we substitute E
[
Ln |Y = Φ−1(1−α)
]
for VaRα(Ln). Hence, at the α confidence level over a given risk measurement horizon, capital
held against unexpected credit losses on a portfolio comprising n obligors is calculated as
Kα(Ln) = E
[Ln |Y = Φ−1(1−α)]− E[Ln]
=
n∑
i=1
δiηiΦ
(
Φ−1(pi)−√ρiΦ−1(1−α)√
1− ρi
)
−
n∑
i=1
δiηipi
=
n∑
i=1
δiηiΦ
(
Φ−1(pi) +
√
ρiΦ
−1(α)√
1− ρi
)
−
n∑
i=1
δiηipi. (2.5)
The last equality follows from the symmetry of the standard Gaussian density function.
Under the IRB approach developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS),
regulatory capital is determined at the 99.9% confidence level over a one-year horizon — a 0.1%
probability that credit losses will exceed provisions and capital over the subsequent year. In
practice, it incorporates a maturity adjustment, denoted νi, to account for the greater likelihood
of downgrades for longer-term claims, the effects of which are stronger for claims with higher
credit ratings. Thus, regulatory capital for a portfolio comprising n obligors reduces to
K99.9%(Ln) =
n∑
i=1
δiηiνiΦ
(
Φ−1(pi) +
√
ρiΦ
−1(0.999)√
1− ρi
)
−
n∑
i=1
δiηiνipi. (2.6)
BCBS (2005) claims that the IRB approach sets regulatory capital for credit risk at a level
where losses exceed it, “on average, once in a thousand years.” Qualifying this informal statement
of probability, BCBS cautions that the 99.9% confidence level was chosen because tier 2 capital
“does not have the loss absorbing capacity of tier 1”, and “to protect against estimation error” in
model inputs as well as “other model uncertainties.” With provisions and capital amounting to
as little as 2.0–3.0% of EAD under the IRB approach, perhaps the claim of protection against
insolvency due to credit losses at the 99.9% confidence level should be interpreted as providing
a margin for misspecification of the ASRF model, and not literally protection against a “one
in a thousand year” event. The choice of confidence level for the ASRF model may also have
This article is c© Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version
to appear on www.arxiv.org. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group
Publishing Limited.
ASSESSING THE BASEL II IRB APPROACH: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRALIA 5
been influenced by the desire to produce regulatory capital requirements that are uncontroversial
vis-à-vis Basel I. These qualifying remarks warn against the complacency engendered by the high
confidence level chosen for the IRB approach.
In order to counter the growing problem of regulatory arbitrage under the Basel I Accord,
and encourage banks to adopt sounder risk management practices, Basel II promotes “better
alignment of regulatory capital requirements with ‘economic capital’ demanded by investors and
counterparties” (Gordy and Howells, 2006). With respect to credit risk, the IRB approach offers
greater risk sensitivity through its use of internal (bank) estimates of unconditional PD, LGD and
EAD to assess regulatory capital charges. Despite the greater convergence between regulatory
and economic capital since the implementation of Basel II, the IRB approach is open to valid
criticism:
• VaR is often criticised because it does not satisfy the subadditivity property, in general,
and is therefore not a “coherent” risk measure (Artzner et al., 1999). However, VaR is
subadditive for elliptical distributions, and the IRB approach models losses on a credit
portfolio as a multivariate Gaussian distribution with default dependence described by a
matrix of pairwise correlations between obligors’ asset values (i.e, an elliptical distribu-
tion). Another common criticism is that at the α confidence level VaR does not give any
information about the severity of losses which occur with probability less than 1−α. The
margin for error and uncertainties implicit in setting a very high confidence threshold on
an elliptical loss distribution arguably blunts the criticism that VaR does not account
for the severity of losses beyond the confidence threshold.
• Real-world credit portfolios do not fully satisfy Conditions (1) and (2) above, collectively
termed “portfolio invariance” by Gordy (2003). As previously noted, credit portfolios of
large, internationally active banks are typically near the asymptotic granularity of Condi-
tion (1). This assertion is supported by Gordy and Lütkebohmert (2007) who apply their
granularity adjustment to German bank portfolios; and Rutkowski and Tarca (2015) who
measure the rate of convergence, in terms of number of obligors, of empirical loss distri-
butions to the asymptotic portfolio loss distribution (i.e., the distribution of conditional
expectation of portfolio percentage loss representing an infinitely fine-grained portfolio).
The Australian banks that have been granted approval to use the IRB approach certainly
qualify as large, internationally active banks. With respect to Condition (2), many asset
value models of credit risk including Moody’s KMV, RiskMetrics and more advanced
internal (bank) models assume that correlations are driven by several factors (e.g., geo-
graphic and industry). But then multi-factor asset value models usually express asset
values as a function of a composite factor obtained by the superposition of underlying
independent risk indices (Bluhm et al., 2010).
• Gordy and Howells (2006) highlight that much of the literature on the procyclicality
of Basel II is written from the perspective of the formulaic minimum capital require-
ments, without adequate consideration of the judgemental supervisory review, which
gives supervisors “the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum”
(BCBS, 2006). Furthermore, they argue that banks respond to an economic contraction
(respectively, expansion) by tightening (loosening) lending standards, which serves to
dampen the procyclicality of IRB capital requirements. Nonetheless, one of the reforms
introduced by Basel III to address lessons of the financial crisis of 2007–09 promotes the
build up of capital buffers through a mandatory conservation buffer and a discretionary
countercyclical buffer. The latter is intended to dampen the procyclicality of IRB capital
requirements arising from internal credit ratings. In Section 3 we look for evidence of
cyclicality in the time series of unconditional PD and LGD assigned to credit exposures
of the major Australian banks.
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• In a related criticism of the “quasi” state dependence of the model specification of the
IRB approach, Jarrow (2007) argues that the concern that making regulatory capital
state dependent would be procyclical and exacerbate the business cycle is overstated
and perhaps unwarranted. It is known that PD and LGD are state dependent (e.g.,
dependent on the state of the economy). Recall from (2.3) that the conditional PD of
obligor i is given by
pi(y) = Φ
(
Φ−1(pi)−√ρi y√
1− ρi
)
. (2.7)
Now, let y = Φ−1(1−α). Then, the PD of obligor i conditional on Y = y may be
interpreted as the probability of default of obligor i is no greater than pi
(
Φ−1(1−α))
in (α × 100)% of economic scenarios. So, from (2.6), PD is state dependent in so far
as α = 0.999. Similarly, LGD is state dependent in so far as BCBS instructs regulated
institutions to provide estimates of economic-downturn LGD rates. The rationale for
this instruction is discussed in Section 3, while the empirical analysis of Section 5.1
recovers realisations of the single systematic risk factor describing the prevailing state of
the Australian economy using downturn and through-the-cycle LGD rates. Regulatory
capital, though, serves the sole purpose of solvency assessment, so the 99.9% confidence
level and downturn LGD rates appear to be prudent choices for reducing the risk of bank
failures.
• BCBS has calibrated the level of correlation parameter ρi in (2.6) by asset class. Section 3
broadly describes the asset classes defined under the IRB approach and the functions
for calculating ρi by IRB asset class. The sensitivity of credit risk capital to asset
correlation in the tail of the portfolio loss distribution (Rutkowski and Tarca, 2015),
draws scrutiny to the regulator specified levels of the IRB correlation parameters. Using
time series of pooled credit loss observations Fitch Ratings (2008) empirically estimated
asset correlations for each IRB asset class. They find that across asset classes, correlation
parameters assigned under the IRB approach are conservative relative to their empirically
derived estimates. Fitch Ratings contend that this conservatism provides a margin for
error during periods of economic distress when correlations tend to spike. Moreover, it
accommodates observed geographic variations in correlation parameters.
• In another criticism of the IRB approach, Frey et al. (2001) examine model misspecifi-
cation. They simulated empirical loss distributions for a range of correlation parameters
and obligor default probabilities assuming that default dependence is modelled by multi-
variate Gaussian and Student’s t distributions. The latter admits tail dependence with
fewer degrees of freedom producing stronger dependence. Note that a multivariate t dis-
tribution inherits the correlation matrix of the multivariate Gaussian distribution that it
generalises. Assuming that default dependence is modelled by a multivariate Gaussian
distribution, credit losses at high quantiles of the empirical loss distribution would be ser-
iously understated if the true model of dependence were a multivariate t distribution. In
a similar exercise, Rutkowski and Tarca (2015) measure the sensitivity of credit risk cap-
ital to default dependence structure as modelled by the one-factor Gaussian copula and
Student’s t copulas with Gaussian margins, and reach a similar conclusion. Frey et al.
(2001) argue that asset correlations are not enough to describe default dependence, and
“[a]n assumption of multivariate normality may not model the potential extreme risk
in the portfolio.” However, they also recommend the use of historical default data to
estimate true default correlations and calibrate credit risk models.
Hamerle and Rösch (2005) demonstrate the robustness of the Gaussian copula, which
underlies the IRB approach, to model misspecification. They simulated empirical loss
distributions assuming that default dependence is modelled by the Student’s t copula,
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and then empirically estimated correlation parameters using the misspecified Gaussian
copula. While parameter estimates for asset correlation exhibit large biases, quantiles of
empirical loss distributions subsequently generated by the misspecified Gaussian copula
with the overestimated asset correlations no longer seriously underestimate true credit
losses. However, the economic damage wrought by the financial crisis of 2007–09 in
the north Atlantic suggests that parameter estimation errors did not conveniently offset
model uncertainties during the recent crisis.
3. Basel II Capital Adequacy Reporting
Under its implementation of Basel II, APRA requires ADIs to assess capital adequacy for
credit, market and operational risks. ADIs determine regulatory capital for credit risk using
either the standardised approach or, subject to approval, the IRB approach. The former applies
prescribed risk weights to credit exposures based on asset class and credit rating grade to arrive
at an estimate of RWA. Then, the minimum capital requirement is simply 8% of RWA. The
standardised approach, which is an extension of Basel I, is straightforward to administer and
produces a relatively conservative estimate of regulatory capital. The IRB approach, which im-
plements ASRF model (2.6), is a more sophisticated method requiring more input data estimated
at higher precision. Its greater complexity makes it more expensive to administer, but usually
produces lower regulatory capital requirements than the standardised approach. As a conse-
quence, ADIs using the IRB approach may deploy their capital in pursuit of more (profitable)
lending opportunities.
Upon implementation of Basel II in the first quarter of 2008, APRA had granted the four
largest Australian banks, designated “major” banks, approval to use the IRB approach to capital
adequacy for credit risk. They include: Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), Westpac
Banking Corporation (WBC), National Australia Bank (NAB), and Australia and New Zealand
Banking Group (ANZ). WBC acquired St. George Bank (SGB) on 1 December 2008, and CBA
acquired Bank of Western Australia (BWA) on 19 December 2008. Putting them in a global
context, all four major Australian banks have been ranked in the top 20 banks in the world by
market capitalisation, and top 50 by assets during 2013. Since the implementation of Basel II,
the major banks have accounted for, on average, 74.6% of total assets on the balance sheet of
ADIs regulated by APRA. Furthermore, of the regulatory capital reported by the major banks,
on average,1 88.0% has been assessed for credit risk, 6.9% for operational risk and 4.4% for
market risk, with other capital charges applied by APRA accounting for the remaining 0.7%.2
ADIs lodge their statutory returns with APRA using a secure electronic data submission
system (APRA, 2014). A return is a collection of related forms covering the same reporting
period. A form is a dataset containing information on a specific topic (e.g., capital, risk class/
sub-class, financial statement, etc.). For reference purposes, forms in spreadsheet format and
instructions are available at www.apra.gov.au. Given the volume of data processed in preparing
statutory returns, the major Australian banks automate their electronic data submissions using
XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) — an XML-based language for preparing, pub-
lishing, extracting and exchanging business and financial information. Once forms are validated
and returns submitted, data are stored in APRA’s data warehouse. We use SQL programming
to fetch and aggregate data reported to APRA by the major banks on a quarterly basis from
1 Average of figures for quarters ending 31 March 2008 through 30 June 2013 published by APRA (2013) in its
quarterly issue of ADI performance statistics.
2 Data are reported for the major Australian banks, in aggregate, so as not to violate confidentiality agreements.
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Figure 1. EAD and RWA, respectively, of IRB credit exposures of the major
Australian banks are decomposed by sector (business, government and house-
hold).
Source: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.
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31 March 2008 through 30 June 2013.3 Specifically, data reported on the statement of financial
performance, capital adequacy form, and IRB credit risk forms.4
Banking book exposures are reported on credit risk forms5 by IRB asset class: corporate (non-
financial), small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME), bank, sovereign, residential mortgages,
retail qualified revolving, and other retail6. For presentation purposes we merge IRB asset
classes, and report credit exposures as business, government or household. Henceforth, we refer
to these banking book exposures as IRB credit exposures. Figure 1 decomposes EAD and RWA,
respectively, of IRB credit exposures into business, government and household sectors. Since
the implementation of Basel II, RWA for credit risk reported by the major Australian banks
has been divided, on average, 71.9/28.1 between IRB credit exposures and other banking book
exposures. The market dominance of the major banks, coupled with the concentration of their
regulatory capital held against unexpected losses on IRB credit exposures, convey the significance
of the ASRF model in protecting the Australian banking sector against insolvency. Accordingly,
we contend that, while focussing exclusively on IRB credit exposures of the major banks, our
empirical analysis draws a representative sample of the credit risk assumed by the Australian
banking sector.
Under the IRB approach, ADIs assign their on- and off-balance sheet credit exposures to
internally-defined obligor grades reflecting PD bands, and LGD bands. Between 2008 and 2013
RWA of IRB credit exposures held in the banking book of the major Australian banks has been
divided, on average, 75.4/24.6 between on-balance sheet assets and off-balance sheet exposures.
3 NAB did not adopt the IRB approach to capital adequacy for credit risk until the second quarter of 2008.
Therefore, in measuring the effect of the financial crisis, we omit NAB from our major banks’ aggregate for the
quarter ending 31 March 2008.
4 For a number of quarters after the acquisitions of BWA and SGB by CBA and WBC, respectively, BWA and
SGB reported credit risk using the IRB approach in parallel with the consolidated reporting of CBA and WBC,
which determined RWA for credit risk in the banking books of BWA and SGB using the standardised approach.
In our analysis we have included the parallel IRB credit risk forms submitted by BWA and SGB, and deducted
the corresponding RWA, as determined by the standardised approach, from the consolidated RWA reported by
CBA and WBC, respectively.
5 Reporting forms and instructions for ADIs available at www.apra.gov.au: ARF_113_1A, ARF_113_1B,
ARF_113_1C, ARF_113_1D, ARF_113_3A, ARF_113_3B, ARF_113_3C, and ARF_113_3D.
6 APRA (2008) provides a full definition of IRB asset classes.
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Figure 2. Risk characteristics of credit portfolios (IRB credit exposures) of the major Australian banks, rebalanced
quarterly, by sector (business, government and household), as well as for the whole portfolio. Credit risk variables
and parameters include: exposure-weighted unconditional PD, economic-downturn LGD, asset correlation and maturity
adjustment.
Sources: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.
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EAD, RWA, expected loss, and exposure weighted LGD, unconditional PD, maturity and firm
size are reported for each obligor grade. We assign IRB credit exposures reported by the major
banks to standardised PD bands (i.e., consistent across the major banks), and calculate risk
parameters characterising each of these standardised obligor grades. The ASRF model incorpo-
rates a maturity adjustment, which is a function of maturity and unconditional PD, for business
and government credit exposures. Asset correlation is constant for residential mortgages and
retail qualified revolving credit exposures; a function of unconditional PD for corporate, bank,
sovereign and other retail credit exposures; and a function of firm size and unconditional PD for
SME credit exposures (BCBS, 2005). We construct a commingled credit portfolio by pooling
obligor grades across IRB asset classes. Figure 2 plots exposure-weighted PD, LGD, asset corre-
lation and maturity adjustment for commingled credit portfolios, rebalance quarterly, by sector
(business, government and household), as well as for the whole portfolio.
Prudential standards published by APRA instruct ADIs to assign one-year unconditional
(through-the-cycle) PDs and economic-downturn (stressed) LGD rates to IRB credit exposures.
If the major banks were reporting unconditional PDs, one would expect that temporal variations
in reported PDs would be explained exclusively by changes in portfolio composition. In reality
though, the prevailing state of the economy likely affects reported PDs to a degree. That is,
reported PDs are the result of perturbations of through-the-cycle estimates by point-in-time
influences. Figure 2 shows the variation in reported exposure-weighted PD for the whole portfolio
ranging from 0.91% to 1.18%. Assuming that portfolio composition was unchanged between 2008
and 2013, and using an exposure-weighted asset correlation of 16.8%,7 the corresponding range
of realisations of the single systematic risk factor describing the state of the economy is less than
one-quarter of one standard deviation. This is a fraction of the range of realisations of the single
systematic risk factor recovered from the ASRF model in Section 5.1. Accordingly, we don’t
believe that our conclusions are materially effected by point-in-time influences on reported PDs.
During an economic downturn losses on defaults are likely to be higher than under “normal”
economic conditions. In developing the IRB approach to capital adequacy for credit risk, BCBS
considered implementing a function that translates average, or through-the-cycle, LGD rates
into downturn LGD rates, similar to the function derived by Vasicek (2002), which transforms
unconditional PDs into conditional PDs. In principle, this function could depend on several
factors including the state of the economy, magnitude of the average LGD, and asset class of
the exposure. Given the evolving nature of LGD modelling and practices for estimating LGD at
the time, BCBS elected to instruct ADIs to provide estimates of downturn LGD rates (BCBS,
2005). There is no inconsistency here when assessing regulatory capital charges, since capital
is held against unexpected losses arising under recessionary conditions. However, using down-
turn LGD rates to recover realisations of the single systematic risk factor from the ASRF model
yields a prevailing state of the economy that is more expansionary than would be recovered using
point-in-time LGD rates, assuming that the economy was not experiencing a (severe) downturn.
The empirical analysis of Section 5.1 addresses this complication by recovering realisations of
the single systematic risk factor describing the prevailing state of the Australian economy using
downturn and through-the-cycle LGD rates. Note that distance-to-default, which measures the
level of capitalisation, reflects the capacity to absorb credit losses under stressed economic condi-
tions. So, it is appropriate to use downturn LGD rates when translating realisations of the single
systematic risk factor recovered from the ASRF model into estimates of distance-to-default.
RWA, capital and provisions are reported on the capital adequacy form.8 RWA are reported by
risk class, and within the credit risk class, for IRB asset classes and the standardised approach.
7 The exposure-weighted asset correlation of the IRB credit exposures of the major Australian banks averaged
0.168 for quarters ending 31 March 2008 through 30 June 2013.
8 Reporting form ARF_110_0_2 and instructions for ADIs available at www.apra.gov.au.
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Figure 3. Risk-based capital ratio (capital / RWA) of the major Australian
banks decomposed into tier 1 and tier 2 capital.
Source: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.
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These data are aggregated across capital adequacy forms submitted by the major Australian
banks. Note that the minimum capital requirement is simply 8% of RWA. Then, subject to a
minimum 8% of RWA, APRA sets a prudential capital ratio for each ADI, and an ADI typically
holds a capital buffer above its prudential capital requirement (APRA, 2007). Figure 3 decom-
poses the aggregate capital base of the major banks, measured as a percentage of RWA, into
tier 1 and tier 2 capital.
Finally, we take credit losses as charges for bad and doubtful debts reported on the statement
of financial performance,9 or income statement. Credit losses are aggregated across income
statements reported to APRA by the major banks.
4. Recent Performance of the Australian Economy
In conducting our evaluation of the model specification of the Basel II IRB approach, we use
internal bank data collected by APRA to solve for realisations of the single systematic risk factor
describing the prevailing state of the Australian economy. These readings of the Australian
banking sector are then compared with signals from macroeconomic indicators and financial sta-
tistics10 to render our assessment. Here, we describe the performance of the Australian economy
over the past decade, a period which includes the financial crisis of 2007–09, also known as the
global financial crisis. While the crisis precipitated the worst global recession since the Great
Depression, its effects were not evenly felt across the globe. In order to contextualise the Aus-
tralian economy we compare its performance with that of the United States and United Kingdom,
economies that experienced the full force of the recent crisis. The resilience of the Australian
9 Reporting form ARF_330_0_C and instructions for ADIs available at www.apra.gov.au.
10 Measures of financial position (stocks) and performance (flows), national and company level.
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economy to the crisis is evident from a review of macroeconomic indicators and financial statis-
tics that portend or reflect credit stresses: real GDP growth, unemployment rate, house prices,
and return on equity of the banking sector.
A number of explanations for the resilience of the Australian economy have been proffered:
• Since the mid 2000s Australia has benefited from a favourable movement in terms of
trade driven by the strong global demand for commodities, much of it coming from
Asia. An appreciating foreign exchange rate over the same period has been a key factor
in the relatively smooth adjustment of the economy to the increase in terms of trade
(Bishop et al., 2013). Inflation has been consistent with the target set by the Reserve
Bank of Australia (RBA), unemployment has remained relatively low, and economic
growth has mostly been around trend — the economy registered a mild contraction in the
fourth quarter of 2008, but did not experience a recession. These economic fundamentals
have shielded Australia from the financial crisis.
• Residential mortgages, typically floating rate with full recourse to the borrower, have
accounted for 50–60% of loans on the balance sheet of Australian banks over the past
decade. With the vast bulk of residential mortgages originated by the banks and held
to maturity, the risks associated with the banks’ residential mortgage portfolios are
comparatively small. Other notable structural factors of the Australian financial sector
which serve to constrain excessive risk taking include: the government’s “four pillars”
policy precluding mergers between the four major banks, which dominate the Australian
financial sector; and the ability of the Australian banks to pay fully-franked dividends
to shareholders (Lewis, 2013). The attention to risk quantification and management by
the major banks, in order to achieve Basel II IRB approval in 2008, arguably helped
discourage excessive risk-taking too (Brown and Davis, 2010).
• APRA, which is responsible for the regulation of deposit-taking institutions, insurance
companies and superannuation funds, distinguishes prudential supervision in Australia
by its active, risk-based approach (Lewis, 2013). BCBS (2012) calls for greater focus
on risk-based supervision in its core principles for effective banking supervision: “[t]his
risk-based process targets supervisory resources where they can be utilised to the best
effect, focussing on outcomes as well as processes, moving beyond passive assessment of
compliance rules.” There were significant failures of non-bank financial companies during
the financial crisis with investors, rather than taxpayers, bearing the losses. The list of
failed companies includes: Absolute Capital, Allco Finance Group, Babcock and Brown,
Opes Prime, RAMS Home Loans and Storm Financial. Australia’s banking sector, on the
other hand, experienced no failures. Indeed, while banks’ profitability declined during
the crisis, it remained quite healthy. Also, the major Australian banks maintained their
AA credit rating through the crisis (Brown and Davis, 2010; D’Aloisio, 2010).
• In October 2008 the Australian Government introduced two schemes, announced with
a three-year duration, to guarantee bank funding. Under the Financial Claims Scheme,
all deposits up to $1 million with locally-incorporated ADIs were automatically guar-
anteed by the government with no fee payable. Under the Funding Guarantee Scheme,
the government provided a guarantee, for a fee, on deposits over $1 million and whole-
sale funding with maturity out to five years. The RBA believes that these schemes
achieved their goal of maintaining public confidence in the Australian banking sector
(Senate Standing Committees on Economics, 2011).
• At the onset of the financial crisis, in October 2007, the RBA sought to restore liquidity
to dysfunctional credit markets by expanding the range of securities it would accept
as collateral for repurchase agreements to include residential mortgage-backed securities
and asset-backed commercial paper (Debelle, 2007). Then, as the crisis spread to the
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Figure 4. Resilience of the Australian economy to the financial crisis of 2007–09. Its performance is compared with
that of the United States and United Kingdom on macroeconomic indicators and financial statistics: real GDP growth,
unemployment rate, house price index, and return on equity of the banking sector.
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority; US Bureau of Economic Analysis; US Bureau of Labor
Statistics; US Federal Reserve Economic Data; Standard & Poor’s; UK Office of National Statistics.
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real economy, the RBA slashed its target cash rate from 7.25% in August 2008 to 3.0%
in April 2009. Importantly, much of the monetary policy easing was passed through
to borrowers. With most household and business loans in Australia being variable,
lower interest rates translated into higher disposable incomes. Falling interest rates
coupled with rising incomes improved housing affordability somewhat, and helped avert
a sharp correction in the housing market, which had boomed over the previous decade
(McDonald and Morling, 2011).
• Between October 2008 and February 2009 the Australian Government announced sub-
stantial fiscal stimulus packages: $10.4 billion Economic Security Strategy; $15.2 billion
Council of Australian Governments funding package; $4.7 billion Nation Building pack-
age; and $42 billion Nation Building and Jobs Plan. The Treasury estimates that, absent
the fiscal stimulus, GDP growth would have been negative for three consecutive quarters
(McDonald and Morling, 2011).
• Finally, the “lucky” country was probably not without a dose of good fortune.
The charts in Figure 4 clearly indicate that the Australian economy was largely cushioned
from the adverse effects of the recent crisis. Putting the mild contraction experienced by the
Australian economy during the financial crisis of 2007–09 in an historical context, we compare
it with Australia’s most recent recession in 1990. During the financial crisis real GDP growth
in Australia fell 0.7% in the fourth quarter of 2008, and unemployment peaked at 5.9% in June
2009. By comparison, during the 1990 recession the Australian economy contracted 1.7% and
unemployment rose to 10.8%. A number of financial institutions failed including the State Bank
of Victoria, the State Bank of South Australia, the largest credit union (Teachers Credit Union of
Western Australia), the second largest building society (Pyramid Building Society), and several
merchant banks. Moreover, two of the four major Australian banks incurred heavy losses and
had to be recapitalised. The 1990 recession is considered similar in magnitude to those of 1974
and 1961, but not as severe as the recession of 1982 when the economy contracted 3.7% and
unemployment rose to 10.5% (Macfarlane, 2006).
5. Measurements from the ASRF Model of the Australian Banking Sector
The ASRF model prescribed under the Basel II IRB approach is an asset value factor model.
As noted in Section 2, other asset value models include Moody’s KMV, RiskMetrics, and most
internal bank models. They too are generally factor models. We believe that our empirical
findings on the ASRF model are applicable to the broader class of asset value factor models of
credit risk.
Applying the ASRF model, with appropriate substitutions, to internal bank data collected
by APRA, our empirical analysis generates time series of: (i) the single systematic risk factor
describing the prevailing state of Australia’s economy; and (ii) distance-to-default measuring the
capacity of its banking sector to absorb credit losses. Then, comparing these time series with
macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings we render a fundamental
assessment of the model specification of the IRB approach. Furthermore, since the depths of
the financial crisis of 2007–09 were reached after the implementation of Basel II, this time series
analysis measures the impact of the crisis on the Australian banking sector. Finally, in a variation
on the evaluation of distance-to-default, reverse stress testing explores stress events that would
trigger material supervisory intervention. Again, access to internal bank data collected by the
prudential regulator distinguishes our research from other empirical studies on the IRB approach
and recent crisis.
Taking measurements from the ASRF model of the Australian banking sector requires internal
bank data collected by APRA under Basel II. Data reported on IRB credit risk forms by the
major banks are available since the first quarter of 2008 on a quarterly basis. Recall that IRB
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credit risk forms assign credit exposures to an obligor grade identifying a PD band within an
IRB asset class. Pooling obligor grades, reported as at the end of a given quarter, across IRB
asset classes constitutes a commingled credit portfolio in which each obligor grade is represented
as a single credit. The quarterly observations between 31 March 2008 and 30 June 2013 establish
a time series of commingled credit portfolios.
Recall that δi(t), ηi(t), νi(t), pi(t) and ρi(t) denote the EAD, LGD, maturity adjustment,
unconditional PD and asset correlation assigned to credit i as at the end of quarter t. They
are input to the ASRF model, which makes projections of losses on IRB credit exposures over
the subsequent four-quarter interval [t+1, t+4]. As noted in Section 3, these parameters and
variables are reported on IRB credit risk forms submitted to APRA by the majors banks on a
quarterly basis.
5.1. Prevailing State of the Australian Economy. The model specification of the IRB
approach assesses regulatory capital charges by calculating the expectation of credit losses con-
ditional on a realisation of the single systematic risk factor. Substituting losses incurred on IRB
credit exposures into the ASRF model, we recover realisations of the single systematic risk factor
describing states of the Australian economy experienced since the implementation of Basel II.
Then, applying the standard Gaussian distribution function yields the quantile of the distribution
of economic scenarios.
For any one-year horizon over which the ASRF model makes projections of credit losses, we
choose to associate the model inputs with the realisation of the single systematic risk factor as
at the midpoint of the corresponding risk measurement horizon. So, measuring time in quarterly
increments, realisation y(t) of systematic risk factor Y describing the state of the economy as at
the end of quarter t is associated with credit losses projected over the time interval [t−1, t+2]
using credit risk parameters and variables reported as at the end of quarter t−2.
Suppose that for each quarter in the time series, there is a total of r banking book exposures
subject to credit risk, of which n IRB credit exposures are held in the aforementioned commingled
portfolio, where n ≤ r. Denote by Rn(t), Rr(t) andR(t) the RWA of IRB credit exposures, RWA
for credit risk and total RWA, respectively, as at the end of quarter t. Let Lr(s) be the total credit
losses incurred during quarter s, which is reported on the statement of financial performance. We
do not observe Ln(s), losses incurred on IRB credit exposures during quarter s. Therefore, we
choose to allocate total credit losses incurred during the four-quarter interval [s−1, s+2] between
IRB credit exposures and other banking book exposures in proportion to RWA as at the end of
the quarter t−2. So, losses on IRB credit exposures incurred during quarters s−1, s, s+1 and
s+2 is given by
Rn(t−2)
Rr(t−2)
(Lr(s−1) + Lr(s) + Lr(s+1) + Lr(s+2)). (5.1)
In taking measurements from the ASRF model of the Australian banking sector, we assume
that there is no delay in the recognition of bad debts. (Later, we allow for delays in the recognition
of bad debts.) Setting s = t, projected credit losses over any one-year horizon are compared
with credit losses incurred during the same one-year interval. Then, applying the formula for
conditional expectation of portfolio credit losses,
Rn(t−2)
Rr(t−2)
(Lr(t−1) + Lr(t) + Lr(t+1) + Lr(t+2))
=
n∑
i=1
δi(t−2)ηi(t−2)νi(t−2)Φ
(
Φ−1
(
pi(t−2)
)−√ρi(t−2) y(t)√
1− ρi(t−2)
)
, (5.2)
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we solve for realisation y(t) of systematic risk factor Y .11 Repeating this static analysis for
each quarter t from 30 September 2008 through 31 December 2012 generates a time series of
systematic risk factor Y . The ASRF model assumes that the conditional expectation of portfolio
credit losses rises as the economy deteriorates — a strictly decreasing function of the single
systematic risk factor. By convention the α quantile of the distribution of E[Ln |Y ] is associated
with the 1−α quantile of the distribution of Y . Hence, confidence level α(t) corresponding to
realisation y(t) of systematic risk factor Y is given by
α(t) = 1− Φ(y(t)). (5.3)
As discussed in Section 3, prudential standards published by APRA instruct ADIs to assign
economic downturn (stressed) LGD rates to IRB credit exposures. Denote by ηi(t) the downturn
LGD assigned to credit i as at the end of quarter t. Setting ηi(t) = ηi(t) for i = 1, . . . , n in (5.2)
and solving for realisation y(t) of systematic risk factor Y yields a prevailing state of the economy
that is more expansionary than would be recovered using point-in-time LGD rates, assuming that
the economy was not experiencing a (severe) downturn. In solving for realisations of the single
systematic risk factor describing the prevailing state of the economy, we also examine the effect
of adjustments to downturn LGD rates. Recognising that banks may not be able to produce
internal estimates of downturn LGD, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al. (2007)
proposed a “linear supervisory mapping function” for translating through-the-cycle LGD rates
into downturn LGD rates: ηi(t) = 0.08 + 0.92η¯i(t), where η¯i(t) is the through-the-cycle LGD
assigned to credit i at the end of quarter t. The adjustment varies between zero and eight
percent, decreasing linearly from low to high through-the-cycle LGD rates. Using historical
LGD rates from their database, Moody’s derived an adjustment method to meet the downturn
LGD requirement imposed under the IRB approach. Their adjustment to through-the-cycle LGD
rates depends on the seniority of the obligations, with the magnitude also varying from zero to
eight percent (Emery, 2007). We demonstrate the effect of adjustments to downturn LGD rates
by solving (5.2) using four definitions of LGD: ηi(t) = ηi(t), ηi(t) = η¯i(t), ηi(t) =
1
3
ηi(t), and
ηi(t) =
1
2
ηi(t) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Figure 5 plots realisations of the single systematic risk factor describing the prevailing state
of the economy. On the basis of downturn LGD rates, as reported by the major banks, the
economic shock imparted by the financial crisis of 2007–09 propagated through the Australian
banking system inflicting credit losses incurred, on average, once every five years. That is, at
the depths of the crisis, the prevailing state of the Australian economy as recovered from (5.2) is
summarised by realisation y = −0.81 on 31 December 2008. Appealing to Gordy’s proposition,
y = −0.81 translates into the 79.1% quantile of the portfolio loss distribution — credit losses
incurred were no greater than expected in 79.1% of economic scenarios, which we characterise
informally as (approximately) a one-in-five-year event. We argue that the single systematic risk
factor is a germane measure of the impact of the financial crisis, because the IRB approach chooses
realisation y = −3.090 of systematic risk factor Y to assess regulatory capital charges that are
expected to absorb credit losses in 99.9% of economic scenarios. Bear in mind, though, that
measurements from the ASRF model describing the prevailing state of the Australian economy
capture policy responses of government departments and agencies (i.e., The Treasury, RBA and
APRA) designed to mitigate the recent crisis. Naturally, it is not possible to isolate these policy
responses in order to ascribe a value to their mitigating effects.
11 We use the GNU Scientific Library routine gsl_root_fsolver_falsepos, which implements the false position
algorithm, to solve for y(t). A root bracketing algorithm based on linear interpolation, its convergence is linear,
but it is usually faster than the bisection method.
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Figure 5. Realisations of the single systematic risk factor describing the pre-
vailing state of the Australian economy, and the effect of adjustments to down-
turn LGD. Confidence level α is the probability of the state of the economy
being better than the economic scenario described by realisation y. For credits
i = 1, . . . , n constituting the commingled portfolio at the end of quarter t:
(a) ηi(t) = ηi(t), where ηi(t) is downturn LGD.
(b) ηi(t) = η¯i(t), where η¯i(t) is through-the-cycle LGD and
ηi(t) = 0.08 + 0.92η¯i(t).
(c) ηi(t) =
1
3
ηi(t).
(d) ηi(t) =
1
2
ηi(t).
-2.00
-1.75
-1.50
-1.25
-1.00
-0.75
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
D
ec
-0
8
J
u
n
-0
9
D
ec
-0
9
J
u
n
-1
0
D
ec
-1
0
J
u
n
-1
1
D
ec
-1
1
J
u
n
-1
2
95
90
84
77
69
60
50
40
31
23
16
S
y
st
em
a
ti
c
ri
sk
fa
ct
o
r
Y
C
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
le
v
el
α
,
%
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Translating downturn LGD rates into through-the-cycle LGD rates using the linear supervi-
sory mapping function proposed by Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al. (2007), real-
isations of the single systematic risk factor recovered from (5.2) indicate that the recent crisis
inflicted credit losses on the Australian banking system incurred, on average, once every seven
years. Given that the Australian economy contracted during the financial crisis, and assuming
that through-the-cycle LGD rates obtained from downturn LGD rates using the linear super-
visory mapping function are good estimates, we would argue that the shock experienced by
the Australian economy at the depths of the crisis was between a one-in-five-year and one-in-
seven-year event. This seems consistent with the perception that Australian banks weathered
the recent crisis quite well, reporting good profitability and high capital ratios, and maintaining
strong credit ratings.
For reference, Figure 5 also plots realisations of the single systematic risk factor recovered
from (5.2) using LGD estimates that are one-third less than, and half of downturn LGD rates.
Under these assumptions for point-in-time LGD at the depths of the crisis, the shock experience
by the Australian economy was a one-in-ten-year and one-in-twenty-year event, respectively. In
the analysis that follows we use the time series of the single systematic risk factor recovered from
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Figure 6. Realisations y(t) of systematic risk factor Y describing the prevailing
state of the Australian economy and real GDP growth, y-o-y. The time series
exhibit a moderately strong correlation (+0.60).
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics.
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(5.2) using downturn LGD rates, as reported by the major Australian banks. We would reach
broadly the same conclusions using point-in-time LGD rates.
Real GDP growth, plotted for the Australian economy in Figure 4, is conventionally reported
as seasonally adjusted, quarter-over-quarter. Quarterly realisations of the single systematic risk
factor are recovered by equating credit losses projected over a one-year horizon with credit losses
incurred during the same one-year interval. Accordingly, we restate quarterly observations of
real GDP growth for the Australian economy as year-over-year. Figure 6 plots time series of the
single systematic risk factor describing the prevailing state of the Australian economy and real
GDP growth, year-over-year. The time series are quite strongly correlated (+0.60), suggesting
that the single systematic risk factor serves as a reasonable proxy for the relative state of the
economy. Indeed the correlation between the time series rises to +0.72 when realisations of the
single systematic risk factor are lagged by one or two quarters. Arguably, realisation y(t) of
systematic risk factor Y leads real GDP growth, but realisation y(t) cannot be computed until
credit losses Lr(t+2) are recognised in profit and loss for quarter t+2. Overall, observations
of the prevailing state of the Australian economy recovered from (5.2), and plotted in Figures 5
and 6, agree rather well with the macroeconomic indicators and financial statistics plotted in
Figure 4.
As noted above, we do not observe losses on IRB credit exposures. Hence, we choose to allocate
total credit losses incurred between IRB credit exposures and other banking book exposures in
proportion to RWA. Figure 7 illustrates that even if we were to attribute credit losses entirely to
IRB credit exposures and use downturn LGD rates in (5.2), the financial crisis of 2007–09 would
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Figure 7. Impact of the financial crisis of 2007–09 on the credit portfolios of
the major Australian banks. Realisation y of systematic risk factor Y describes
the prevailing state of the economy. Confidence level α is the probability of
the state of the economy being better than the economic scenario described by
realisation y.
(a) Credit losses are allocated between IRB credit exposures and other banking
book exposures in proportion to RWA.
(b) Credit losses are allocated entirely to IRB credit exposures providing a lower
bound on Y .
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have inflicted credit losses on the Australian banking system not exceeding those incurred, on
average, once every eight years — a lower bound on the severity of the crisis in Australia.
The model specification of the IRB approach was developed for the purpose of solvency assess-
ment, or capital adequacy. A credit risk model of capital adequacy requires precision in the
measurement of absolute risk levels under stressed economic conditions associated with the tail
of the portfolio loss distribution (BCBS et al., 2010). Recognising that realisations of the single
systematic risk factor describing states of the Australian economy experienced since the imple-
mentation of Basel II correspond to observations away from the tail of its distribution, we cannot
attest to the validity of the ASRF model for regulatory capital modelling. However, we argue
that our findings support a favourable assessment of the ASRF model, and asset value factor
models of credit risk in general, for the purposes of capital allocation, performance attribution
and risk monitoring. These management functions, generally served by economic capital models,
need only be accurate in the measurement of relative risk under “normal” economic conditions.
It could be argued that delays in the recognition of bad debts warrant introducing a lag in
the association of projected credit losses with credit losses incurred. Figure 8 plots the time
series of the prevailing state of the economy (i.e., realisations of the single systematic risk factor)
assuming no delay in the recognition of bad debts (s = t), along with time series assuming delays
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Figure 8. Impact of the financial crisis of 2007–09 on the credit portfolios
of the major Australian banks. Sensitivity of the single systematic risk factor
describing the prevailing state of the economy to delays in the recognition of bad
debts. Confidence level α is the probability of the state of the economy being
better than the economic scenario described by realisation y of systematic risk
factor Y .
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of one quarter (s = t+ 1) and two quarters (s = t+ 2). Introducing lags to account for possible
delays in the recognition of bad debts does not materially alter our measurement of the impact
of the financial crisis on the credit portfolios of the major Australian banks at the depths of the
crisis — it remains, informally speaking, a one-in-five-year event (using downturn LGD rates).
This empirical analysis begins with the initial submission of capital adequacy and IRB credit
risk forms as at 31 March 2008 and credit losses recognised in profit and loss between 1 April
2008 and 31 March 2009, and solves for the single systematic risk factor describing the state of
the economy as at 30 September 2008. Our measurement of the impact of the financial crisis on
the Australian banking sector is necessarily predicated on the assumption that the effect of the
crisis was most acutely felt after 31 March 2008. Figure 9 indicates that credit losses incurred by
the major Australian banks peaked in the fourth quarter of 2008 and remained elevated through
2009, and global equity indices plumbed their lows during the first quarter of 2009 — S&P ASX
200 index fell 54% between November 2007 and March 2009.
Our measurement of the impact of the financial crisis on the Australian banking sector is
buttressed by the macroeconomic stress test administered by APRA on the major Australian
banks in 2012. The three-year economic scenario developed for the stress test by APRA in
conjunction with the RBA and Reserve Bank of New Zealand, was designed to be comparable
with the actual experience of the United States and United Kingdom during the recent crisis. In
particular, the macroeconomic stress test envisaged: real GDP contracting 5%; unemployment
rising to 12%; house prices falling 35%; and commercial property prices falling 40%. None of the
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Figure 9. Dating the inception of the financial crisis of 2007–09. Credit losses
incurred by Australian banks peaked, and global equity indices plumbed their
lows, after the implementation of Basel II.
Sources: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority; Bloomberg.
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major Australian banks would have failed under this severe but plausible economic scenario, nor
would any of the major banks have breached the 4% minimum tier 1 capital requirement of the
Basel II Accord (Laker, 2012).
5.2. Australian Banks’ Capacity to Absorb Credit Losses. Distance-to-default, which
measures the level of capitalisation, reflects the capacity to absorb credit losses. Substituting
provisions set aside for absorbing expected losses and capital held against unexpected losses on
IRB credit exposures into the ASRF model, and translating realisations of the single systematic
risk factor into distance-to-default, we measure the level of capitalisation of the major Australian
banks, in aggregate,12 since the implementation of Basel II.
Suppose that banks set aside provisions and hold capital that are sufficient to absorb credit
losses at the α confidence level. Denote by Qr(t) provisions set aside for absorbing expected
credit losses as at the end of quarter t, and K(t) the capital base as at the end of quarter t,
both reported on the capital adequacy form. Recall that APRA sets a prudential capital ratio,
subject to a minimum 8% of RWA, for each ADI, and an ADI typically holds a capital buffer above
its prudential capital requirement. Since we observe neither provisions set aside for absorbing
expected losses nor capital held against unexpected losses on IRB credit exposures, we choose an
allocation procedure. Provisions are allocated between IRB credit exposures and other banking
book exposures in proportion to expected losses over the subsequent four quarters as projected
at the end of quarter t:
Qn(t) =
E
[Ln(t+1) + Ln(t+2) + Ln(t+3) + Ln(t+4)]
E
[Lr(t+1) + Lr(t+2) + Lr(t+3) + Lr(t+4)] Qr(t). (5.4)
Capital is allocated between IRB credit exposures and other risk exposures (i.e., non-IRB credit
exposures, and operational, market and securitisation risks) in proportion to RWA as at the end
of quarter t:
Kn(t) = Rn(t)R(t) K(t). (5.5)
Hence, provisions set aside for absorbing expected losses and capital held against unexpected
losses on IRB credit exposures as at the end of quarter t is equal to Qn(t) +Kn(t).
12 Results are reported for the major Australian banks, in aggregate, so as not to violate confidentiality agreements.
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We estimate distance-to-default by solving for realisation y˜(t) of systematic risk factor Y that
equates the sum of (5.4) and (5.5) to the conditional expectation of portfolio credit losses:13
Qn(t) +Kn(t) =
n∑
i=1
δi(t)ηi(t)νi(t)Φ
(
Φ−1
(
pi(t)
)−√ρi(t) y˜(t)√
1− ρi(t)
)
. (5.6)
Recall that APRA’s prudential standards instruct ADIs to assign unconditional PDs and down-
turn LGD rates to IRB credit exposures. Since distance-to-default reflects the capacity to absorb
credit losses, usually under stressed economic conditions, it is appropriate to use downturn LGD
rates to estimate distance-to-default. Hence, ηi(t) = ηi(t) for i = 1, . . . , n and for all t in (5.6).
Note that the sum of provisions set aside for absorbing expected credit losses and capital held
against unexpected credit losses in (5.6) replaces the sum of expected losses and regulatory cap-
ital in the ASRF model described in Section 2. Denote by d˜(t) the distance-to-default as at the
end of quarter t. Then,
d˜(t) = −y˜(t), (5.7)
which translates into confidence level
α˜(t) = 1− Φ(− d˜(t)) = Φ(d˜(t)). (5.8)
It follows from (5.5) that the risk-based capital ratio as at the end of quarter t, plotted in
Figure 3, is given by
κ(t) =
K(t)
R(t) =
Kn(t)
Rn(t) . (5.9)
Table 1 reports quarterly risk-based capital ratio of the major banks, in aggregate, along with
implied distance-to-default. Since 2008 they have maintained a capital base that is consistent
with targeting a credit rating between A and AA (i.e., a target confidence level between 99.96%
and 99.99%). Note that, under the prudential standards of APRA (2008), if provisions set aside
are insufficient to absorb expected credit losses, the shortfall is deducted from capital. The
general agreement of our estimates of distance-to-default with credit ratings issued by external
rating agencies seemingly lends further support to a favourable assessment of the model specifi-
cation of the IRB approach. However, distance-to-default is a measure of capital adequacy, and
Section 5.1 argues that we cannot attest to the suitability of the ASRF model for the purpose
of solvency assessment, because realisations of the single systematic risk factor experienced in
Australia since the implementation of Basel II correspond to observations away from the tail of
its distribution. Therefore, we report estimates of distance-to-default with the caveat that (5.6)
models default dependence in the tail of the portfolio loss distribution as a multivariate Gauss-
ian process. It is generally acknowledged that models which assume that financial data follow a
Gaussian distribution tend to underestimate tail risk. If we were to model default dependence
by heavier-tailed distributions, we would recover narrower estimates of distance-to-default. Also,
credit losses incurred at the depths of the financial crisis would correspond to a quantile of the
portfolio loss distribution further from the tail, and thus associated with a less contractionary,
or more expansionary, state of the economy.
In contrast to our evaluation of the capacity of the major banks to absorb credit losses during
the financial crisis, Allen and Powell (2012) argue that Australian banks did not fare much better
than their global counterparts. They compared the distance-to-default of the Australian banking
sector with that of the banking sectors in the United States, Europe and Canada. In their
implementation of the KMV/Merton structural methodology, distance-to-default is a function
of implied market value and volatility of assets imputed from equity prices. Allen and Powell
13 We use the GNU Scientific Library routine gsl_root_fsolver_falsepos, which implements the false position
algorithm, to solve for y˜(t).
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Table 1. As reported risk-based capital ratio κ(t), and implied distance-to-default d˜(t) of the major Australian banks,
in aggregate. The reverse stress test uncovers the weakest economic shock yˆ(t) that would result in a breach of the
capital ratio floor κ. Realisation y(t) describes the prevailing state of the economy.
Reverse stress test Prevailing state
of the economyAs reported κ = 4.0% κ = 8.0%
t κ(t), % d˜(t) α˜(t), % yˆ(t) αˆ(t), % yˆ(t) αˆ(t), % y(t) α(t), %
31-Mar-2008 10.67 3.504 99.977 −2.915 99.822 −1.90 97.10
30-Jun-2008 10.73 3.413 99.968 −2.845 99.778 −1.87 96.94
30-Sep-2008 10.98 3.508 99.978 −2.946 99.839 −2.01 97.78 −0.58 71.9
31-Dec-2008 11.51 3.588 99.983 −3.044 99.883 −2.17 98.49 −0.81 79.1
31-Mar-2009 11.38 3.621 99.985 −3.044 99.883 −2.12 98.29 −0.74 77.1
30-Jun-2009 11.10 3.620 99.985 −3.018 99.873 −2.04 97.94 −0.51 69.4
30-Sep-2009 11.52 3.682 99.988 −3.095 99.902 −2.17 98.51 −0.39 65.1
31-Dec-2009 11.85 3.732 99.991 −3.160 99.921 −2.28 98.88 −0.16 56.3
31-Mar-2010 11.82 3.717 99.990 −3.145 99.917 −2.26 98.82 0.11 45.5
30-Jun-2010 11.51 3.677 99.988 −3.090 99.900 −2.17 98.48 0.30 38.4
30-Sep-2010 11.50 3.680 99.988 −3.092 99.901 −2.16 98.48 0.56 28.7
31-Dec-2010 11.27 3.653 99.987 −3.057 99.888 −2.10 98.20 0.71 23.8
31-Mar-2011 11.49 3.682 99.989 −3.098 99.902 −2.17 98.49 0.75 22.7
30-Jun-2011 11.42 3.660 99.987 −3.076 99.895 −2.14 98.38 0.81 21.0
30-Sep-2011 11.48 3.647 99.987 −3.083 99.897 −2.18 98.54 0.79 21.5
31-Dec-2011 11.42 3.642 99.986 −3.077 99.895 −2.17 98.51 0.73 23.4
31-Mar-2012 11.48 3.637 99.986 −3.077 99.896 −2.18 98.55 0.52 30.2
30-Jun-2012 11.44 3.633 99.986 −3.075 99.895 −2.18 98.54 0.46 32.2
30-Sep-2012 11.72 3.659 99.987 −3.121 99.910 −2.28 98.86 0.54 29.3
31-Dec-2012 11.75 3.663 99.988 −3.126 99.911 −2.29 98.89 0.57 28.5
31-Mar-2013 11.69 3.698 99.989 −3.165 99.923 −2.34 99.04
30-Jun-2013 11.42 3.657 99.987 −3.118 99.909 −2.27 98.83
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observed that the distance-to-default for Australian banks narrowed sharply from a peak of 11.31
in 2005 to 0.60 in 2008. Note that a distance-to-default of 0.60 translates into roughly a one-
in-four chance of bank failure, but in reality there were none. An implicit assumption of their
analysis is that security markets consistently price risk fairly. But it’s not uncommon for markets
to exhibit bouts of manic-depressive behaviour. During periods when market participants are
gripped by fear (respectively, driven by greed), their perception of risk is heightened (lessened),
and markets become undervalued (overpriced). We submit that their results are biased by
plummeting equity prices and spiking volatility reflecting the overreaction of market participants
gripped by fear at the depths of the crisis — the S&P ASX 200 Banks index fell 58% between
November 2007 and January 2009. With access to internal bank data collected by APRA, we
produce a fundamental evaluation of the effect of the recent crisis and solvency of Australian
banks that differs markedly from the stock market’s assessment.
5.3. Reverse Stress Testing. Stress testing is an important risk management tool promoted
by supervisors through the Basel II framework. In its principles for sound stress testing, BCBS
(2009) recommends that supervisors make regular and comprehensive assessments of banks’ stress
testing programs, and encourages supervisors to conduct stress tests based on common scenarios
for banks in their jurisdiction.
A key principle of APRA’s supervisory review is that regulated institutions are responsible
for developing and maintaining an internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP) pro-
portional to the size, business mix and complexity of their operations. ICAAP is an integrated
and documented approach to risk and capital management that assesses the risk appetite of an
institution and establishes the commensurate level and quality of capital. As part of ICAAP,
institutions are expected to conduct their own and supervisory-led stress tests. APRA believes
that stress testing goes beyond assessing capital adequacy to informing risk appetite, setting risk
limits, identifying vulnerabilities and developing mitigating actions. The results of stress tests
are used by supervisors “to anchor expectations for the level of capital that an institution should
hold in normal times to provide a sufficient buffer to withstand a challenging environment.”
The results also serve “to inform our [supervisors’] risk assessment of institutions as part of the
development of supervisory action plans” (Laker, 2012).
Usually, a stress test begins with the development of an economic scenario that is the mani-
festation of some stress event or economic shock. It is then translated into conditional (point-
in-time) PDs assigned to obligors constituting a bank’s credit portfolio. Finally, an analytical or
simulation model estimates portfolio credit losses subject to the stress event, which are charged
against provisions and capital to produce an assessment of the bank’s solvency. A variation on
this methodology is reverse stress testing — a technique in which “losses that would render an
institution unviable or subject to material regulatory intervention are identified and attention
then focussed on the types of scenarios that would generate these losses” (Laker, 2010).
Clearly, realisation y˜(t) = −d˜(t), recovered from (5.6), describes an economic scenario that
would render the major banks, in aggregate, insolvent at the end of quarter t if the associated
credit losses were incurred and recognised instantaneously. We extend this rudimentary form of
reverse stress testing to uncover economic scenarios that would cause the major banks to breach
some designated capital ratio floor κ, and consequently trigger material supervisory intervention.
Suppose that the expectation of portfolio credit losses conditional on stress event yˆ(t) is instan-
taneously incurred and recognised in profit and loss at the end of quarter t. Then, the capital
ratio floor would be breached at the end of quarter t if credit losses exceeded
Qn(t) +Kn(t)− κRn(t). (5.10)
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Economic scenarios worse than that described by realisation yˆ(t) of systematic risk factor Y
satisfying (5.11) would result in a breach of the capital ratio floor at the end of quarter t:14
Qn(t) +Kn(t)− κRn(t) =
n∑
i=1
δi(t)ηi(t)νi(t)Φ
(
Φ−1
(
pi(t)
)−√ρi(t) yˆ(t)√
1− ρi(t)
)
. (5.11)
Then, the probability of the state of the economy being better than the economic scenario
described by realisation yˆ(t) is a most
αˆ(t) = 1− Φ(yˆ(t)). (5.12)
Finally, macroeconomic-based models would translate realisations of the single systematic risk
factor into observations of macroeconomic indicators (e.g., real GDP growth, unemployment
rate, house prices, etc.). This final translation is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our rudimentary stress testing methodology has its limitations: it is static; focusses exclu-
sively on credit risk, assuming away market, liquidity and operational risks; fails to consider
diversification benefits or compounding effects arising from the interaction between risk classes;
excludes net interest income earned during the period in which credit losses are incurred; and
does not consider the possibility of raising fresh capital. Yet it puts the severity of the financial
crisis, as experienced by the Australian banking sector, in perspective by comparing it with stress
events that would trigger material supervisory intervention.
Table 1 reports the weakest economic shock yˆ(t) imparted at the end of quarter t that would
result in a breach of capital ratio floors set at 4.0% and 8.0% if credit losses were instantaneously
incurred and recognised in profit and loss. Section 5.1 made reference to the macroeconomic stress
test administered by APRA on the major banks in 2012, describing the severe and plausible eco-
nomic scenario under which none of the major banks would have breached the 4% minimum tier 1
capital requirement. Table 1 indicates that with κ = 4.0%, approximately 99.9% of economic sce-
narios, presumably including the severe but plausible one developed for the macroeconomic stress
test administer by APRA, would not have resulted in the major banks, in aggregate, breaching
the capital ratio floor in 2012. Even with κ = 8.0%, fewer than 1.5% of economic scenarios would
have resulted a breach of the capital ratio floor in 2012. During the recent crisis the capacity of
the major banks, in aggregate, to absorb credit losses appears to have been “stretched” to the
point where 0.22% (respectively, 3.06%) of economic scenarios would have resulted in a breach
of the 4.0% (8.0%) capital ratio floor during the quarter ending 30 June 2008. For comparison,
Table 1 also reports the prevailing state of the economy described by quarterly realisations y(t)
recovered from (5.2) using downturn LGD rates, and plotted in Figures 5 and 6.
6. Conclusion
This paper examines the model specification of the Basel II IRB approach. Our empirical anal-
ysis takes measurements from the ASRF model of the Australian banking sector, and compares
them with signals from macroeconomic indicators, financial statistics and external credit ratings
to render a fundamental assessment. We believe that our findings are applicable to the broader
class of asset value factor models of credit risk. While our fundamental assessment makes obser-
vations about the prevailing state of Australia’s economy and the solvency of its banking sector,
we do not propose model enhancements, nor draw policy implications. Although, our obser-
vations may open a debate on the model specification of the IRB approach or related regulatory
policies.
The ASRF model calculates the expectation of credit losses conditional on a realisation of the
single systematic risk factor, which is interpreted as describing the state of the economy, in order
14 We use the GNU Scientific Library routine gsl_root_fsolver_falsepos, which implements the false position
algorithm, to solve for yˆ(t).
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to assess regulatory capital charges. Substituting credit losses incurred into the ASRF model, we
solve for realisations of the single systematic risk factor generating a time series of the prevailing
state of the Australian economy since the implementation of Basel II. Its moderately strong
correlation with the time series of real GDP growth supports a favourable assessment of the
ASRF model for the purposes of capital allocation, performance attribution and risk monitoring.
Since the depths of the financial crisis of 2007–09 were reached after the implementation of
Basel II, our empirical analysis reveals that the economic shock initiated by the crisis imparted
a mild stress on the Australian banking sector. Then, substituting provisions set aside for
absorbing expected credit losses and capital held against unexpected credit losses into the ASRF
model, and translating realisations of the single systematic risk factor into distance-to-default,
we measure the level of capitalisation of the major Australian banks. In aggregate, they have
maintained a capital base that is reflective of the strong credit ratings issued by external rating
agencies. Reverse stress testing, too, reveals that the major banks were adequately capitalised
to absorb a substantially more severe shock than the one imparted by the recent crisis. Our
fundamental assessment of the impact of the financial crisis on the credit portfolios of the major
banks differs markedly from the stock market’s assessment, which we argue is biased by the
overreaction of market participants gripped by fear at the depths of the crisis.
We reiterate that our estimates of the prevailing state of the economy and level of capitalisation
of the major banks since the implementation of Basel II are recovered from the ASRF model
prescribed under the IRB approach, which models default dependence as a multivariate Gaussian
process. However, it is generally acknowledged that models which assume that financial data
follow a Gaussian distribution tend to underestimate tail risk. If we were to model default
dependence by heavier-tailed distributions, we would find that credit losses incurred at the depths
of the financial crisis correspond to a quantile of the portfolio loss distribution further from the
tail, and thus associated with a less contractionary, or more expansionary, state of the economy.
Also, heavier-tailed distributions would imply a narrower distance-to-default.
Recognising that realisations of the single systematic risk factor describing states of the Aus-
tralian economy experienced since the implementation of Basel II correspond to observations
away from the tail of its distribution, we cannot attest to the accuracy of the ASRF model in
the tail of the portfolio loss distribution, nor its validity for regulatory capital modelling. An
evaluation of the ASRF model for the purpose of solvency assessment, would involve taking
readings of north Atlantic banking jurisdictions that experienced the full force of the financial
crisis of 2007–09. It is unlikely to be as favourable as the qualified evaluation presented here. The
UK banking sector, which has operated under the Basel II framework since 2008, experienced
losses during the crisis on a scale that led to the failure or nationalisation of large banks including
Bradford & Bingley, HBOS, Lloyds Banking Group, Northern Rock and Royal Bank of Scotland.
Moreover, the Basel 2.5 and Basel III reform packages have been developed by BCBS to address
deficiencies of the Basel II framework exposed by the recent crisis.
From our assessment of the model specification of the IRB approach emerges a methodology
for regulators to monitor the prevailing state of the economy as described by the single sys-
tematic risk factor, and the capacity of supervised banks to absorb credit losses as measured
by distance-to-default. While confidentiality agreements preclude us from publishing results for
individual banks, regulators would be at liberty to conduct their analysis on an individual bank
basis. Measurements from the ASRF model signalling an overheating economy and procycli-
cal movements in capital bases, corroborated by macroeconomic performance indicators, would
prompt supervisory intervention. For example, banks could be instructed to build up their
countercyclical capital buffer introduced under Basel III in order to rein in rapidly accelerating
credit growth. Furthermore, a longer history of the time series of the prevailing state of the
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economy recovered from the ASRF model could serve to validate and calibrate macroeconomic-
based models for estimating conditional (point-in-time) PDs. Macroeconomic-based models for
estimating point-in-time PDs usually express the single systematic risk factor as a function of
macroeconomic variables and a random economic shock (Chan-Lau, 2006). This time series could
also inform the development of economic scenarios for stress testing, a standard tool of prudential
supervision.
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